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A Comparison of Belgium and Canada 
 
Tamara Levy, Concordia University 
 
Public Policy and Public Administration, M.A. Candidate 
 
 
In federal societies, intergovernmental relations are necessarily a part of political life.  
But, as a student of intergovernmental relations (IGR), I want to understand, how much 
do intergovernmental relations really matter to particular policy outcomes?  In order to 
assess this question, I have undertaken a study of minority language rights policies in two 
federal societies, Belgium and Canada (the Countries).  In these circumstances, the above 
question is refined and can instead be stated as follows: what factors influence the content 
of minority language policies in the Countries?     
 Again, coming from the perspective of an IGR student, I expected the answer to 
be that intergovernmental relations influence the content of minority language rights.  
However, my initial expectations have been disproved and I have discovered that 
minority language policies in the Countries are more susceptible to normative influences 
than institutional ones.  More exactly, in this essay, I will argue that the dominant 
variables affecting the content of minority language rights in the Countries are the 
relative situation of language groups and the values underlying political culture (the 
Dominant Variables).   
 Both my above-stated research question and hypothesis are not matters of simple 
assertion.  Instead, my study is undertaken against a rich academic background, as the 
topic of minority language rights has been vigorously studied, and theories regarding  
influences and approaches abound.  In my view, the interest in this subject is unsurprising 
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given the somewhat precarious and evolving nature of federal societies and the role 
which minority language groups can play in “making or breaking” a federation.  The 
topic is also of interest because many federal states must consider the accommodation of 
minority language groups, and comparative studies generate much-needed policy 
approaches, and assess the applicability of these approaches to different federal scenarios.   
 Since the issue chosen for study is a relatively complicated and considered one, 
how do I intend to support my contention that the Dominant Variables do dominate the 
outcomes in this policy sector?  Basically, I propose that the primary influence of the 
Dominant Variables can be deduced from the following factors: the reflection of the 
variables in the policy outcomes themselves; and, the evolution of the policy outcomes in 
direct consonance with the evolution of the variables themselves.  Moreover, while the 
variables of primary importance are the same as between the Countries, the way in which 
the Dominant Variables manifest themselves is different, and this difference explains the 
divergent policy outcomes in the Countries.  
 While I draw on the existing literature to build these arguments, the scholars of 
Belgian and Canadian language policies who precede me point to the influence of either 
or both of the Dominant Variables, though fail to question the influence of the variables 
from the “macro” point of view of “what matters to policy outcomes” and fail to link the 
influence of the variables back to the content of the policy.  I intend to address this gap 
and complete the analysis by reviewing both the influence of the Dominant Variables and 
their specific effect on policy outcomes.      
 In terms of the structure of this essay, I proceed in two parts.  In the first part, I 
provide important background information concerning both the framework of federalism 
and the minority language policy outcomes in both of the Countries.  In the second part, I 
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propose which variables affected the divergent policy outcomes in the federal societies 
under review.  In this section I undertake the analysis described briefly above, and argue 
why the Dominant Variables can be asserted as dominant and how they have been 
integrated into policy outcomes.     
 Before undertaking any of this analysis however, I begin with a brief discussion 
of my methodology and the basis of comparison of the Countries.  
APPROACH 
A. Methodology 
In terms of methodology I propose to proceed in my comparative analysis as follows:   
• Define the Framework of Federalism:  In order to define the framework of federalism 
at issue in the two federations, I review two indicators, the constitutional 
arrangements and the institutional arrangements.  As to the former, I identify which 
levels of governments have which powers in the area of minority language rights.  As 
to the latter, I determine what institutional arrangements (formal and informal) are at 
work between levels of government concerning this policy sector.   
• Define the Policy Outcome:  In order to define the policy outcome, I delineate the 
scope of the policy sector, and determine which aspect of “minority language rights” I 
will review.  I intend to define minority language rights by reference to two 
indicators: language of government services and language of (elementary/secondary) 
educational instruction.  Having delimited the policy sector itself, I then define policy 
outcomes in the Countries by reference to these two indicators.   
• Explain the Convergent and/or Divergent Policy Outcomes:   
• In this section, I determine which factors primarily affect the policy outcomes and 
argue how I am able to assess their primary influence.  I propose that the 
Dominant Variables were influential in the Countries, though towards different 
policy outcomes.   
• I define the Dominant Variables as follows:  relative situation of language groups 
refers to the numerical, economic and social importance of the language group, by 
reference to other language groups in society; political culture is the commitment 
to equality between language groups.1   
                                                 
1 Of course there are other aspects to political culture which influence this policy sector, such as a 
commitment to national unity and a pattern of compromise.  However, given the relative brevity of this 
essay, I can not explore all of these values, and instead have chosen what appears to be the most significant 
value, a commitment to equality, and explored only it.  However, again, these other values are important 
and would deserve discussion in a longer paper.      
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• While other variables certainly played a secondary role (such as the judiciary, 
civil society and political actors) given the relative brevity of this paper, I will not 
explore these variables of secondary influence.  Instead, I will restrict my analysis 
to the two variables which I assert played a dominant role.   
• I assess the influence of the Dominant Variables by evaluating how the variables 
are reflected within the policy outcomes and by evaluating how changes in the 
variables engendered changes in policy.     
 
Having proposed the above methodology, I should address why I chose the Countries as 
my case studies, as well as my basis for comparison between the two. 
B. Basis for Comparison 
 
For this study, I sought similar federal countries so that the study could produce a 
reasoned analysis of what causal factors affected policy outcomes, and how those causal 
factors manifested themselves, amongst similar federations.       
 Of course, no two countries are the same; however, both Canada and Belgium are 
to some extent more similar than many.  For example, both countries contain 
medium/small sized populations, a majority/minorities division along linguistic lines and 
a federal structure.  Both countries are also relatively wealthy and have well-established 
democracies.  Of course, there are many dissimilarities, such as the age of the federations 
and the geographic situation of the Countries.  However, the similarities are significant 
and perfect matches can not be found.  Thus, in this study, I should be able to assess, with 
some assuredness, what the causal factors at issue in this policy area are, and conclude 
that divergent (or convergent) policy outcomes are due to the particular manifestation of 
these causal factors in the Countries rather than due to the radically distinct situations of 
the Countries themselves.     
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PART I:  BACKGROUND 
A. Framework of Federalism: Constitutional Considerations  
BELGIUM 
Concerning language, the Belgian constitution divides power between levels of 
governments and sets out important linguistic divisions and responsibilities within 
Belgian society and government.     
 As to the division of powers, the community level of government has primacy in 
language issues.  More exactly, beginning with the 1970 constitutional reforms, 
responsibility for “cultural affairs” was devolved from the federal to the community level 
of government.2  Cultural affairs were later defined to include language as well as nearly 
all aspects of education.3    
 The federal government has limited powers respecting language rights.  In terms 
of education, the federal government retains responsibility for general norms (such as the 
qualification and retirement age of teachers) only.  In terms of government services, the 
federal government apparently lacks specific constitutional jurisdiction, although the 
parameters of its obligations are set out in statute (described below).4   
 In terms of imposing linguistic divisions and responsibilities, the constitution 
recognizes 3 geographic regions (Walloon, Flanders and Brussels-Capital) and three 
cultural communities (French, Flemish and German).5   The communities are granted full 
                                                 
2 M. Jaumain, “Some Features of Cultural Policies Applied in Belgium, Particularly in the French-Speaking 
Community,” Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1997) pp. 205-225 at 
208. 
3 Id., at 209.  
4 K.D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 1986) 
at 161-9. 
5 Articles 2 and 3 of the Belgian Constitution.  The regions (Flanders, Walloon and Brussels-Capital) are 
territorially defined, while the communities (Flemish, French and German) are defined according to 
language and culture.  But these communities also rest largely on a territorial basis: the authority of the 
Flemish community extends over Flanders plus the Flemish speaking population of Brussels, while the 
authority of the French community extends over Walloon (minus its German speaking communes) plus the 
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legislative power over specified areas (as described above).  The Communities’ 
jurisdiction extends to their respective language regions, and to the French and Flemish 
speakers of the Brussels region respectively.  The constitution guarantees linguistic parity 
between French and Flemish ministers in the national cabinet.6   
CANADA 
The Canadian constitution also both divides power and defines certain linguistic rights. 
As to the division of powers, the constitution7 does not specifically assign language to 
either level of government.  Accordingly, a law prescribing the use of language is 
characterized as a law in relation to the institutions or activities that the enactment covers, 
rather than in relation to language.8   
 As to rights, the constitution sets out specific language rights.  The Constitution 
Act, 1867 (C.A. 1867) contains only one provision of interest to our discussion.  
Specifically, it provides that the provincial legislature can make laws in relation to 
education.  Flowing from this right, the province has the power to delineate the language 
of instruction in schools.  However, Section 93 prohibits a legislature from prejudicially 
affecting rights or privileges respecting denominational schools existing by law at the 
time of confederation in 1867.9  Thus, if a language of instruction was a right or privilege 
                                                                                                                                                 
French speaking population of Brussels.  While the Walloon region and French community each have their 
own government, the Flemish region and community are under a single combined council.   
6J. Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federalism (London: Westview Press, 1996) at 162 at 
150.   
7 The Canadian Constitution is essentially comprised of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, 
Appendix II, No. 5 (C.A. 1867) and the Constitution Act, 1982, U.K. Stats. 1982, c. 11, Appendix II (C.A. 
1982).  The C.A. 1867 is most remarkable for its division of power provisions (Sections 91 and 92) 
whereas the C.A. 1982 is most remarkable for its Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).     
8 Both levels of government have used this “constitutional vacuum” to institute laws dealing specifically 
with language.  For example, in Jones v. Attorney General of New Brunswick, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182, the 
Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) upheld the federal Official Languages Act on the basis of the “peace 
order and good government” clause.  Moreover, in Devine v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790, the S.C.C. 
upheld portions of Quebec’s Charter of the French Language on the basis of Section 92(13).  Please see 
P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vols. 1&2, 4th ed. (loose leaf) (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997- ) 
at Section 53.2.  
9 Section 93 applies only to Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, British Columbia and PEI.  
Counterparts are found in the statutes which constituted Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
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of a denomination school in a province at confederation, the province is prevented from 
compelling the denominational school to instruct in a different language.    
 The Consitution Act, 1982 (C.A. 1982) contains a more elaborate set of language 
rights touching on the language of the legislature, government services and education.  In 
terms of government services, sections 16 and 20 set out the relevant obligations.  
According to Section 16, English and French are the official languages of Canada and 
New Brunswick.  According to Section 20, the (federal and New Brunswick) 
governments are obliged to provide bilingual services to the public.10  The other nine 
provinces of Canada have not undertaken any constitutional obligation to provide 
government services in both official languages, although as discussed below, some 
choose to do so.   
 In terms of education, Section 23 of the C.A. 1982 protects minority language 
education rights.  In essence, 3 categories of parents are entitled to “qualified” minority 
language education rights for their children.  The 3 categories are: parents whose mother 
tongue is in the minority (Section 23(1)(a));11 parents whose language of primary school 
instruction in Canada is in the minority (Section 23(1)(b)); and, parents who have or had 
another child enrolled in a minority language of instruction in Canada (Section 23(2)). 
These rights are all subject to the “where numbers warrant” qualification of Section 23(3) 
                                                                                                                                                 
Newfoundland.  Quebec and Newfoundland have since undertaken a constitutional amendment and created 
language school boards.  For a complete discussion, please see Hogg, supra, note 7 at Section 53.8(b).     
10 C.A. 1982, at Sections 16 and 20.  Specifically, the federal obligation attaches to any head or central 
office of an institution of Parliament or the Government of Canada.  It further attaches to any other office 
of the Government of Canada where either there is significant demand for bilingual services from that 
office; or, due to the “nature of the office” it is “reasonable” that bilingual services be provided by that 
office.  The New Brunswick obligation is unqualified, and attaches to “any office of an institution of the 
Legislature or Government of New Brunswick.”  
11 As per Section 59 of the C.A. 1982, Section 23(1)(a) does not apply to Quebec until its Legislative 
Assembly decides to adopt it.  The result is that English speaking parents in Quebec have no right to send 
their children to English speaking schools, unless they fit into the second or third category of parents 
recognized by s. 23.   
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which has been interpreted as providing a “sliding scale of entitlement” based on the 
number of children whose parents qualify.12   
 Having considered the constitutional background to the policy outcomes in the 
minority language sector, it is equally important to consider the institutional background.     
B. Framework of Federalism: Institutional Considerations 
 
Neither Belgium nor Canada has highly-developed institutions of intergovernmental 
relations relating to minority language rights.   
BELGIUM 
 
Belgium has certain institutions representing both intra- and inter-state federalism 
concerning minority language rights.  As to intra-state federalism, the Belgian Senate was 
intended to be a regional body, with a portion of the senators directly elected, and another 
portion elected from the ranks of the communities.13  In addition to the parity requirement 
for federal cabinet, the executive requires overall legislative support and the consent of a 
majority of legislators within their linguistic groups.  The executive also decides by 
consensus, giving French and Dutch speakers a mutual veto-right.  Finally, any 
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment touching upon regional issues must be 
approved by two-thirds of the MPs in the federal lower house and senate, including a 
majority of each of the linguistic groups (in both houses).14   
 As to inter-state federalism, the constitution contains an “alarm bell” procedure 
which initiates a Conciliation Committee.15  An assembly pulls an “alarm bell” when it 
perceives that the initiative of another assembly could cause it serious harm.  The 
                                                 
12 Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 366. 
13Senators are elected from the Communities as follows:  10 Flemish, 10 French, 1 German.  The other two 
classes of Senators are “co-opted” and royal princes.   
14W. Swenden, “Assymetric Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium” Publius Vol. 32, No. 3 
(Summer 2002) pp. 67-87 at 76. 
15 Id., at 76-7.   
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Conciliation Committee then tries to resolve the impasse.  The committee is itself a 
model of intergovernmental co-ordination, as its members include the Prime Minister, the 
leaders of the French and Flemish Communities and the regions.  A small secretariat 
exists to support the work of the conciliation committees, and has extended its work to 
inter-ministerial conferences, of which there are now 15, including education.16 
CANADA 
 
The intergovernmental structure concerning minority language rights in Canada is also 
relatively under-developed.  In terms of intra-state federalism, the Senate of Canada, a 
body intended to (in small part) represent the regions in the Parliament of Canada, has a 
Committee on Official Languages with a mandate to study matters relating to official 
languages generally.17  The Supreme Court of Canada also contains an element of intra-
state federalism with its pattern of regional representation.  Specifically, since 1949, three 
judges on the court are from Quebec, three from Ontario, two from the Western provinces 
and one from the Atlantic.  The Chief Justice of the court has usually alternated between 
Francophone and Anglophone.18    
 In terms of inter-state federalism, there is both a formal and informal aspect to the 
institutional structures.  As to formal, the Ministerial Conference on Francophone Affairs 
consists of the federal ministers of intergovernmental affairs and Canadian Heritage and 
the provincial ministers responsible for francophone affairs (and intergovernmental 
affairs in Quebec).  The Conference concerns itself with “all government activity relating 
to French-language services, official languages, and the Francophone and Acadian 
                                                 
16 Fitzmaurice, supra, note 6 at 162.  
17 For additional information concerning this Senate Committee, please see 
http://parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenHome.  
18 Statute requires that 3 judges be from Quebec.  However, the remainder of the court is appointed by 
“rough allocation”, is a function of convention and may vary.  Please see Hogg, supra, note 7 at Section 8.3 
for a full discussion.   
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communities.”19  Also, the Council of Ministers of Education (CMEC) consists of the 
provincial ministers of education, and both consults intergovernmentally, and administers 
certain intergovernmental official languages programs and agreements.20       
 There are also informal institutions at work.  While it is difficult to place a label 
on such informal structures, several authors cite their existence and influence.21  
Moreover, the results of such informal relations are clear in the realm of both services 
and education.  Relating to services, the federal government has entered into federal-
provincial agreements to assist provincial governments provide services to official 
language minority communities.22  Relating to education, in addition to the “formal 
work” of the CMEC, the informal relations between governments have netted bilateral 
agreements to provide ad hoc support for special educational measures such as the 
establishment of post-secondary institutions.23  
 Given this background concerning federalism, it is now worthwhile to consider 
the background concerning policy outcomes. 
 
                                                 
19 The purpose of this organization seems to be primarily to co-ordinate efforts and exchange information. 
For additional details, please see the organization’s website, http://207.228.248.225/usrlib/afi/en/index.htm.  
Interestingly, not a single source researched for this paper referred to this organization.   
20 For example, the federal government and the provincial governments work through the CMEC on the 
“Official Languages in Education Program” which established a five year memorandum of understanding 
concerning the funding of minority-language education activities.  See www.cmec.ca for complete 
information on the council.  Interestingly, only a single source researched for this paper referred to this 
organization.   
21 For example, please see S. Churchill, New Canadian Perspectives: Official Languages in Canada: 
Changing the Language Landscape (Ottawa: Canadian Heritage, 1998) at 21and 24, and R. Schmidt, Sr. 
“The Politics of Language in Canada and the United States: Explaining the Differences” in T. Ricento & B. 
Burnaby, eds., Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities (Mahwah: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1998) at 50.   
22 For further information, please see the details provided by the Department of Canadian Heritage at 
http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/lo-ol/progs/efpp-fpap_e.cfm.  For example, the Canada-British 
Columbia Agreement, signed in April 2001, transfers $1.5 million over three years to B.C. to allow it to 
provide additional support to its Francophone citizens.  The full text of the agreement is available at 
http://www.gov.bc.ca/igrs/down/canada.pdf.   
23 Government of Canada, The Next Act: New Momentum for Canada’s Linguistic Duality, the Action Plan 
for Official Languages (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2003) at Section 3.1.4. 
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C. Framework of Policy Outcomes 
 
Minority language rights could be defined broadly or narrowly.  Given the comparative 
brevity of this paper, I have chosen a relatively narrow definition of minority language 
rights – namely, access to government services and instruction in (elementary and 
secondary) education in one’s language of birth.  I review the content of language 
policies, by reference to these two indicators, for both of the Countries in the upcoming 
section.    
BELGIUM 
 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
 
The policy outcome concerning government services in Belgium is theoretically quite 
simple.  In brief, Flanders and Walloon are officially unilingual language regions, 
functioning in Flemish and French respectively while the Brussels region is officially 
bilingual.  The general rule for the national public service is bilingualism of service but 
unilingualism of employees.24  These policies were the result of essentially 2 waves of 
legislative reform.  In the first wave of 1932 the general principles were established, 
whereas in the second wave of 1963, the enforcement of the principles was reinforced 
and certain loopholes were closed.25   
EDUCATION 
 
Similar to government services, in education, waves of reform resulted in a policy of 
unilingual instruction according to region.  Specifically, according to the 1932 law, the 
language of instruction in Flanders, Walloon (and the German cantons) is the language of 
the region, whereas the language of instruction in Brussels is the child’s mother tongue or 
                                                 
24 McRae, supra, note 4 at 151.  It should be noted as well that the much smaller German speaking area in 
the Liege province (in Walloon) also functions unilingually.  The German aspects to Belgian language 
policy are relatively insignificant and will not be pursued in this paper.  
25 McRae, supra, note 4 at 189-91. 
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usual language.  However, given some loopholes in the law of July 1932, allowing 
children to be educated in a language other than that of the region, following 1932, 
Flanders had a mostly Francophone system.26  Thus, the 1963 law was promulgated to 
apply the principles of the 1932 law more extensively and rigorously.   
 Essentially, in addition to affirming the two general principles of the 1932 reform, 
the 1963 law provided that minority education facilities at the elementary level would 
only be available, at a specific level of demand, for four groups of communes with 
minority language populations.  Moreover, in order to qualify for “mother tongue” 
language of instruction, enrolment could only take place after a parental declaration of 
mother tongue which was then checked by a special linguistic inspectorate.27    
 This regime, dependent upon the language of the region, exists to date, although 
responsibility for education (and all matters concerning language) has since been 
devolved to the community level.          
CANADA 
 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
 
It is useful to review the language of government services in terms of federal and 
provincial services.  In terms of federal services, the government’s main commitments 
are set out in Section 20 of the C.A. 1982 and Section 2 of the Official Languages Act of 
1969.28  As described above, overall, the federal government has adopted a “pan-
Canadian” approach and undertaken to provide services in either French or English, 
based on the citizen’s choice, at any government head office, and at any other office, 
whenever it is either reasonable, or there is sufficient demand therefore. 
                                                 
26 Id., at 220. 
27 Id., at 221. 
28 Official Languages Act, 1968-69, R.S.C. 1970, c. O-2 (hereinafter OLA).  The principles of the OLA 
were affirmed and added to in the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.31 (4th supp.). 
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 In terms of provincial services, each province provides a different level of 
minority language service.  The level of service provided in the minority language by 
each province is summarized in a table, attached at Appendix A.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, it is useful to note that only New Brunswick offers all government services in 
both official languages.  Some other provinces such as Ontario and Manitoba have 
designated “bilingual zones” where all government services are provided in either official 
language.  Quebec on the other hand offers a variety of services in English, though does 
not have officially designated bilingual zones.  Finally, certain provinces, such as 
Newfoundland and Saskatchewan offer only a telephone referral or translation service for 
their francophone populations.   
EDUCATION  
 
The obligation to provide minority language education is set out in Section 23 of the 
Charter.  Quebec is exempt from Section 23(1)(a), although all the other provisions of 
Section 23 apply to Quebec, and the entire section applies to all the other provinces.  
Nonetheless, since Section 23 does not establish any absolute obligations, but rather one 
susceptible to interpretation, based on the “where numbers warrant” threshold, the 
provinces have provided varying levels of minority language access depending upon their 
numbers and their interpretation of their Section 23 obligations.  The solution adopted by 
each province is summarized in the table at Appendix A.  In brief, every province offers a 
different level of minority language instruction with, again, only New Brunswick offering 
equality of instruction between English and French, Ontario offering French language 
instruction regardless of a numbers threshold, and certain other provinces offering only 
scant minority language instruction.   
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 While it is difficult to assess whether this level of service satisfies Section 23, 
overall, S. Churchill notes that, as of 1998, 9 provinces had substantially implemented 
their Charter guarantees, with only British Columbia missing the mark.29  Although, 
given the lack of an absolute standard, existing efforts may not continue to meet 
constitutional scrutiny.  In fact, recent S.C.C. cases have chastised provinces for failing to 
properly implement their Section 23 obligations.30  Thus overall, the level of minority 
language education across the provinces could be considered both inconsistent and 
evolving.   
 Against this background of both the federalist and the policy framework, it is 
appropriate to now discuss which factors caused minority language rights policies to 
develop as they did.  I will begin this analysis with a discussion of the influence of the 
relative situation of language groups.   
PART II: DISCUSSION 
 
A. Relative Situation of Language Groups 
 
I. NUMERICAL IMPORTANCE REFLECTED IN THE POLICY OUTCOME 
 
According to this argument, the relative situation of language groups can be asserted as a 
dominant influence on policy outcome because the numerical importance of the language 
group is so neatly reflected within the policy outcome itself.  In other words, I can argue 
that the relative situation of the minority language group has causally affected policy 
                                                 
29 Churchill, supra, note 21 at 32. 
30 For example, in Arsenault-Cameron v. PEI [2000] 1 S.C.R. 3, the S.C.C. ordered PEI to provide a school 
for the Francophone children of Summerside, rather than just providing bus service to a school 28 km 
away.  In a further example, in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, the 
S.C.C. upheld a lower court’s “Reporting Order” which required Nova Scotia and its school board to use 
their “best efforts” to provide Francophone school facilities and programs by particular dates and to report 
to the court on its progress, in response to a Section 23 violation.  Similarly, an appeal is pending before the 
S.C.C. concerning Quebec’s interpretation of Section 23.  For a summary of that appeal, please see 
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2004/03/22/canada/language_challenge040322. 
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outcomes because the relative situation, assessed numerically, is so clearly projected 
within the terms of the policy.   
 This argument is purest in the Belgian example.  In Belgium, language policy can 
be described as symmetric.  The French and Flemish languages are treated equally, each 
with the exact same impact over the same level of population and territory.  Interestingly, 
in keeping with the argument, Belgian society is also almost perfectly symmetric.  
According to A.B. Murphy, a “remarkable” feature of Belgium’s “linguistic geography” 
is its near perfect numerical and territorial parity between the French and the Flemish.  In 
Murphy’s view, “there are few culturally or ethnically divided states that have as close a 
numerical balance between the major groups as does Belgium.”31  Similarly, according to 
the 1991 census figures, approximately 60% of the Belgian population is Flemish 
speaking, while 40% is French speaking.32  Again, given this near-perfect distribution, 
symmetric policies appear to be in response to the symmetric break-down of the 
population.  In this way, it can be asserted that policy outcomes in this sector have been 
causally influenced by the relative numerical situation of language groups in Belgian 
society.   
 In the Canadian example the policy outcomes do not reflect as neatly the 
numerical importance of language groups, though the causal effect of this variable is still 
clear by looking to the policy outcome’s encapsulation of the general quantitative 
importance of the minority group.  For example, at the provincial level, only one 
province, New Brunswick, grants parity to the two languages.  While the Francophone 
minority does not represent a strict 50% of the New Brunswick population, it does 
                                                 
31 A.B. Murphy, The Regional Dynamics of Language Differentiation in Belgium: A Study in Cultural-
Political Geography (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988) at 4. 
32 J.G. Prevost and J.P. Beaud, “Statistical Inquiry and the Management of Language Plurality in Canada, 
Belgium and Switzerland,” Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter 2002) pp. 88-117 at 96. 
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represent approximately 35% of the population, more than any other language minority 
within a province and admittedly a significant proportion.33  Thus according to the 
argument, it is unsurprising that the minority language rights should be so generous.  
Moreover, after New Brunswick, the provinces with the next most significant official 
language minorities, Quebec (13%) Ontario (5.0%) and Manitoba (4.4%)34 are also the 
provinces with the next most significant minority language rights.  Finally, again 
consistent with the argument, the provinces with the least significant minority groups 
have the most restrictive minority language rights.  For example Newfoundland, with its 
0.4% minority language population, offers only translation services to its Francophone 
minority rather than actual government services.  Similarly, British Columbia, with its 
1.5% minority language population, was cited in the Churchill study as having failed to 
implement its Section 23 obligations.35   
 Thus, like in Belgium, at the provincial level in Canada, the content of policies 
reflect generally the numerical importance of the minority language group, with rights 
declining as numbers decline and vice versa.  In this way, we can see that the relative 
status of the language groups has causally impacted policy outcomes     
 Admittedly, federal level policies are less consistent with this argument.  The 
federal government has committed itself to pan-Canadian provision of minority language 
services, even though Francophones represent only approximately 25% of the Canadian 
population.36  Thus, the two official languages are arguably treated equally, even though 
the relative groups are not equal in size.  While this disparity between numerical 
importance and policy outcomes would superficially disprove the argument, I do not 
                                                 
33 Statistics Canada, Canada Census, 1996 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 J.E. Magnet, “Language Rights Theory in Canadian Perspective” in Ricento & Burnaby, eds., supra, note 
20 at 186.   
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believe that the argument should be rejected on this basis.  First, with its “numbers 
warrant” and “reasonable” thresholds, the actual practice, as opposed to the letter, of the 
policies has roughly adhered to the relative situation of language groups.  For example, 
approximately 37% of positions in the federal public service are designated bilingual and 
approximately 31% of the public service was Francohpone in 2002.37  While these figures 
do not illustrate exactly how many federal government services were provided in French 
as opposed to English, it does provide some insight into the break-down and suggests 
that, at most, approximately 35% of federal government services were provided in 
French.  This level of service is fairly consistent with the approximate numerical 
importance of the Francophone community in Canada.   
 Second, the relative situation of language groups extends beyond numerical 
importance and as the subsequent argument will detail.  Francophones in Canada have 
enjoyed emerging relative importance in Canada (beyond their numbers), and this 
emerging importance helps further explain the content of the federal policy outcomes.  I 
turn to this argument now.                 
II. AS THE RELATIVE SITUATION OF LANGUAGE GROUPS CHANGE, SO DOES THE 
CONTENT OF THE POLICIES  
 
According to this argument, the influence of the relative situation of language groups on 
policy outcomes can be measured by observing how policy outcomes change in keeping 
with changes to the relative situation of language groups. 
 Belgium illustrates this argument well.  In Belgium, Francophone Belgians 
typically dominated Belgian society and so did the French language.  However, as the 
Flemings gained power (and the French lost power) Flemish earned parity with French.  
In greater detail, in 1830, Francophone Belgians dominated politics, education, economy 
                                                 
37 Government of Canada, supra, note 23 at Section 5.1.3.   
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and society and accordingly, French was the state language.38 However, by 1963, Flemish 
was firmly entrenched as equal to French.  In my view, this change can be accounted for 
by adjustments in relative position between the French and the Flemings.       
 On the demographic level, following World War II, the Flemings grew in 
importance relative to their French compatriots.  Specifically, between 1948 and 1980, 
Flanders outgrew Walloon, with the population of Flanders growing by 24.1% and the 
population of Walloon by only 8.2%.39  The importance of this numerical shift is 
discussed above.   
 However, beyond a demographic shift, over time, an important economic shift 
took place to the advantage of Flanders and the disadvantage of Walloon.  Beginning 
with Independence, though most rapidly following WWII, the economic centre of 
Belgium moved from Walloon to Flanders.  Specifically, Belgian’s first wave of 
industrialization took place in Walloon, with its important steel and coal industries.  
However, following WWII, the coal and steel industry, and therefore Walloon’s 
economic fortunes, declined, while Flanders, with its “new industries” of electronics, 
petrochemicals, highly skilled labour, foreign investment and diversification, 
flourished.40  In output terms, overall, between 1955 and 1960, Flanders GDP grew by 
16.5% while Walloon’s GDP grew by only 5.5%.  Moreover, per capita income in 
Flanders overtook per capita income in Walloon in 1966.41  
                                                 
38 M. Covell, “Minority Language Policy in Canada and Europe: Does Federalism Make a Difference?” in 
H. Bakvis & G. Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 249 and P. Kurzer, “Decline or Preservation of Executive 
Capacity? Political and Economic Integration Revisited,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 35, No. 
1 (March 1997) pp. 31-56 at 36. 
39 McRae, supra, note 4 at 48. 
40 J. Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: Crisis & Compromise in a Plural Society (London: C. Hurst & 
Company, 1988) at 62 
41 Ibid.  
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 Language policy captured the impact of this shift in economic fortunes.  
Specifically, bolstered by their new relative strength, the Flemish demanded redress on 
the language front.  According to P. Kurzer, Flemish leaders, “emboldened” by their 
transformation, began demanding state reforms and began to challenge the “persistent 
primacy” of French in higher education, state bureaucracies and Brussels.42  J. 
Fitzmaurice describes it as the Flemish movement demanding from the French speaking 
state “consideration commensurate to its size and economic power.”43 
 While the Flemings sought and achieved linguistic parity with the French, it is 
interesting that given their demographic and economic ascendance, they did not seek 
more than parity.  In my view, this is because the French were able to remain superior to 
the Flemings in terms of the last category of relative situation, social situation.  Because 
of this, the French were able to “balance” the language demands of the Flemings.   
 Specifically, French has a privileged status in Belgian society.  According to K.D. 
McRae, French is considered prestigious:  Flemish parents believe that bilingual 
education is necessary for their children’s upward mobility, and the French cling to a 
feeling of superiority which is undisputed by the Flemish.44  Thus relatively speaking, the 
French have a better social situation than the Flemings and this appears to have 
influenced their ability to claim language parity.       
 Overall, these complicated demographic, economic and social adjustments in 
relative situation between the French and the Flemish in Belgium are clearly reflected in 
language policies.  In essence, the Flemings have achieved language parity in keeping 
with their numerical and economic growth, while the French have protected language 
parity despite their relative decline, though commensurate with social status.   
                                                 
42 Kurzer, supra, note 38 at 39. 
43 Fitzmaurice, supra, note 6 at 267.  
44 McRae, supra, note 4 at 94, 314 and 325.   
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 In Canada it is also possible to measure the impact of the relative situation of 
language groups on policy outcomes by observing how policies changed as the relative 
situation of language groups changed.   
 As detailed above, Canada’s language policies underwent important changes from 
the late 1960’s through to 1982.  As a result of these changes, French moved from being 
marginalized, to being equal at the federal level, supreme in Quebec, and increasingly 
important in some other provinces as well.  Again, in my view, a dominant influence over 
this evolution in policy is the relative situation of language groups.     
 Generally speaking, until the 1960s, Francophones in Canada played a secondary 
role in society.45  However, beginning with the Quiet Revolution, Francophones in 
Quebec, and even outside Quebec began to climb in importance.  According to Churchill, 
with the Quiet Revolution, French speaking Quebeckers: 
…shook off the traditions of a clerically-dominated civil, mainly rural society, 
modernized the structures of the provincial government, expanded massively the public 
education system, founded a host of post-secondary institutions serving French speakers 
and expanded their control of the private sector economy.46 
Many authors comment on how this Francophone emergence affected the policy 
landscape throughout Canada.  In terms of its effect on Quebec language legislation, 
according to C.M. MacMillan, Bill 101 (the Charter of French Language) was “an 
important symbolic gesture” emphasizing the quality and influence of the French 
language in Quebec life and an effort to assert Quebecois personality “in all aspects of 
Quebec life.”47  In M. Covell’s view, in Quebec, “the economically disadvantaged and 
culturally threatened French linguistic community mobilized politically and used the state 
                                                 
45 Covell, supra, note 38 at 243.  
46 Churchill, supra, note 21 at 14.  Please also see Schmidt, supra, note 21 at 65.  
47 C.M. MacMillan, The Practice of Language Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1998) at 101.  
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to secure its culture and redistribute group power in its favour.”48  Finally, according to T. 
Ricento, language planning in Quebec was used to overcome lingering resentment 
relating to [past] socioeconomic subordination.49  Thus clearly, in the Quebec context, as 
French power grew, so did French language rights.   
 In terms of the effect of the emerging Francohpone movement on federal 
legislation, the federal regime responded by introducing a new language regime.  More 
exactly, certain authors describe the OLA as the federal government’s response to the 
Quiet Revolution.50  Precisely, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 
(B&B Commission) was appointed by the federal government to respond to the “new 
force of Quebec’s nationalism” in Canadian public life.  The Commission was charged 
with finding a more “modern” solution to the enduring difficulties between French and 
English language groups in Canada.51  Of course it was the B&B Commission which 
recommended the OLA provisions concerning equality between the two languages.  So in 
this indirect way, “French power” engendered an entirely new federal language regime.  
 At the provincial level (outside Quebec), the effects of the changing situation of 
language groups on policy can be observed as well.  For example, the emergence of 
Francophone “power” prompted all of the provinces to take some action to extend their 
minority language services.  For example, in 1977 (following the 1976 Parti Quebecois 
election) the nine (non-Quebec) premiers adopted a declaration agreeing that they would 
“make their best efforts to provide instruction in English and French [to official language 
minorities] wherever numbers warrant.”52  
                                                 
48 Covell, supra, note 38 at 252.  
49 T. Ricento, “Partitioning by Language: Whose Rights are Threatened?” in Ricento & Burnaby, eds., 
supra note 21 at 320-1.  
50 Schmidt, supra, note 21 at 40. 
51 Id., at 47 
52 Churchill, supra, note 21 at 22.  
Levy, Minority Language Rights: What Matters? 
 
 22
 Apparently, though, only the provinces which were internally struck by the 
changing balance between Francophones and Anglophones actually instituted any 
considerable policy changes.  For example, certain authors cite that at the same time as 
the Quiet Revolution, Francophone minorities in New Brunswick and Ontario also began 
to assert themselves.53  Not surprisingly, these provinces were the only ones who 
undertook meaningful policy extensions to Francophone minorities.  For example, in 
1970, Ontario gave official status to French in the Legislature, and between 1979 and 
1986, French was extended to become an official language of the entire provincial court 
system for criminal matters.54  Thus consistent with the argument, in those provinces with 
a changing situation between language groups, policy changes came about in reaction to 
that changing situation.  However, in those provinces without any emerging Francophone 
power, there was also no corresponding change in policy.   
 While the relative situation of language groups explains to a meaningful degree 
the policy outcomes in this sector, it does not explain all.  In order to shed further light on 
the “causes” of the content of minority language rights policies I turn now to consider the 
influence of political culture.   
B. Political Values and Culture 
 
For this discussion, I propose two arguments in support of the dominant causal influence 
of political culture on policy outcomes in this sector.  First, I argue that the causal 
influence of political culture can be asserted based on how clearly the political values are 
reflected within policy outcomes; and second, I argue that the influence of political 
culture can be measured by observing how policy outcomes shift to respond to threats to 
political values.  
                                                 
53 Id., at 14; Covell, supra, note 38 at 243; Prevost & Beaud, supra, note 32 at 106.   
54 Churchill, supra, note 21 at 39. 
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I. POLITICAL VALUES ARE REFLECTED IN THE POLICY OUTCOMES  
Belgium has always officially extolled its commitment to equality between French and 
Flemish and this commitment, and the response thereto, has been neatly reflected in 
policies.  In terms of a commitment to equality, as McRae points out, in Belgium: 
…every question on the political agenda has been scrutinized closely from a linguistic 
and regional standpoint, and appropriate balances have been sought….political tendency 
…to demand an equilibrium between Flanders and Wallonie in all policy decisions.55  
M. Jaumain also comments on the enduring commitment to equality in Belgian society.  
Jaumain notes that there are several pillars in Belgian society and that each pillar works 
to reach agreements that reflect the proportional influence of each group.56   
 This commitment to equality has been clearly integrated into language policies.  
McRae calls the “absolute equality of the two official languages” one of the four 
principles of Belgian language legislation.57  While not repeated here, as described above, 
French and Flemish are treated equally by statute and by the constitution.   
 It is not universally accepted, however, that a commitment to equality is part of 
Belgium’s political belief system.  For example, Murphy argues that it is not a 
commitment to equality which motivates Belgian society, but rather, what motivates is 
the “double minority complex” and a desire within the two groups to be separate and 
apart.  According to Murphy, the Flemings have minority feelings because of their 
traditional linguistic disadvantage and economic stagnation while the Walloons began to 
suffer from minoritization in the 1960s due to their economic and demographic decline, 
which began following WWII.58  
                                                 
55 McRae, supra, note 4 at 116. 
56 Jaumain, supra, note 2 at 207. 
57 McRae, supra, note 4 at 151.  The other 3 principles are: Flanders and Wallonie are officially unilingual 
language regions; the national public service is bilingual in service but unilingual in employees and 
Brussels is officially bilingual. 
58 Murphy, supra, note 31 at 141.  
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 Policy outcomes do possibly reflect this double-minority complex.  Fitzmaurice 
describes the effect of the complex as follows: In reaction to the Flemish nationalist 
movement, the Walloon movement developed, and the two communities then turned 
inwards towards themselves, seeking autonomy in cultural and economic policy areas.59  
Murphy completes the thought and argues that in terms of policy outcomes, because of 
the double minority complex, language became organized along ethno(-regional) lines so 
that each language group could avoid feeling dominated by the other.60 
 I am not prepared to resolve this debate today, and conclude whether it was 
indeed the quest for equality or the double-minority complex which is in fact reflected 
within Belgium’s existing language regime.  However, it is worthwhile to note the debate 
and note that regardless of which aspect of political culture motivated the content of the 
policy, it was clearly political culture (however you circumscribe it) which influenced 
policy outcomes and which is encapsulated therein.     
 The commitment to equality is equally promoted as a Canadian political value, 
although in Canada, like in Belgium, there is some debate as to what equality means in 
this policy context.  The policy outcomes capture the equivocating tone of the debate 
over the content of the political value.   
 Equality between French and English at the national level is widely accepted. The 
B&B Commission took as its guiding principle the equal partnership of the two linguistic 
communities61 and wrote, “the proper goal for Canada is an equal partnership not only of 
the two people who founded Confederation but also of each of their respective languages 
                                                 
59 Fitzmaurice, supra, note 6 at 78. 
60 Murphy, supra, note 31 at 131-2 and 141. 
61 MacMillan, supra, note 47 at 71. 
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and cultures.”62    Academics agree with this conception of Canadian political culture.  As 
J.E. Magnet describes it, Canada “formed out of two nations as a binational state.  
Binationality (duality) is a fundamental inspiration of Canada’s system of governance.”63  
 This commitment to equality is clearly enshrined within federal language policies.  
Both the OLA and the Charter advocate that French and English are equal within Canada 
and attempt to create a framework of equal status and equal treatment for English and 
French speakers.64  As Magnet writes: 
Canadian language rights strive to create fair processes for the participation of both 
communities in the machinery of government, and attempt to moderate the effects of 
linguistic differences in the operation of the governmental machine.65   
If this commitment to equality is part of the Canadian political value system, what 
explains certain provinces’ reluctance to implement equal policies for the two language 
groups at the provincial level?   MacMillan explains the variation by arguing that support 
for rights is uneven, and that studies indicate that support for provincial language rights 
changes according to region and according to the language right at stake.  However, the 
same studies illustrate that Canadians consistently believe that it is the federal 
government’s role to protect official language minorities and to promote both official 
languages.66  Against this inconsistency, MacMillan concludes that: 
…the present array of language policy commitments, consisting of a short list of 
constitutionally entrenched language rights applicable to only the federal government and 
New Brunswick, national commitments to minority language education…and freedom 
for the remaining provinces is closely attuned to the public predisposition in these 
matters...67 
                                                 
62 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.  (1967) Report (Vol. I) Ottawa: Queen’s Printer 
at 4-5.   
63 Magnet, supra, note 36 at 199.  
64 Churchill, supra, note 21 at 18. 
65 Magnet, supra, note 36 at 188. 
66 MacMillan, supra, note 47 at 39-43 and Churchill, supra, note 21 at 54. 
67 MacMillan, supra, note 47 at 228. 
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In other words, there is an unwavering commitment to equality at the federal level, 
though a wavering commitment to equality at the provincial level.  This fluctuating 
interpretation of the political value of equality is clearly reflected in policy outcomes. 
 The influential role of political culture can also be measured by observing how 
policies change in defense of threatened political values.  I turn to this argument next. 
II. AS POLITICAL VALUES ARE THREATENED, POLICY OUTCOMES WILL   CHANGE TO 
PROTECT THOSE VALUES  
 
According to this argument, one can measure the influence of political culture by 
observing how the policy outcomes change to protect the political value, as the political 
value is threatened.   
 This argument is well-illustrated in the Belgian example.  In Belgium, as 
described above, there is a commitment to equality, but there has also been a 
reconfiguration of relative power in favour of the Flemings.  This rebalance between 
Fleming and French has contributed to the “downgrading” of the idea of “Belgian-ness” 
in favour of regional-linguistic association,68 which can of course be perceived as a 
“threat” to the commitment to equality.  Arguably, it is difficult to preserve the value of 
equality against this threat, but language policy has responded with some protective 
measures.  Specifically, as the commitment to equality was threatened by the evolving 
Flemish movement and Walloon response thereto, equality was continually reinforced.  
For example, during the 1970 constitutional amendments, article 86 was promulgated to 
guarantee parity between French and Flemish speakers in the national cabinet.  Further, 
the language laws of 1963 reinforced the rule that national public services are bilingual 
but employees are unilingual.  This formula was apparently adopted to protect the 
                                                 
68 M. O’Neill, “Belgium: Language, Ethnicity and Nationality,” Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 53, No. 1 
(January 2000) pp. 114-134 at 117.  
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equality of Walloons within the public service.69  Thus, while Belgian society has 
undergone some fundamental changes which challenge the commitment to equality, 
language policy has responded by protecting equality, rather than discounting it.   
 In Canada the dominant influence of political culture can also be gauged by 
considering how policy outcomes have evolved in response to threats to the equality 
guarantee.  The argument in the Canadian context is best illustrated by reviewing the 
evolution of language laws in Quebec.  Specifically, in Quebec, it is compellingly argued 
that the province’s language regime, which promotes French and demotes English, was 
actually prompted by the threat to equality created by the federal government’s 
inadequate language policies.     
 In greater detail, as described above, the B&B Commission enunciated a 
commitment to equality between French and English speakers in Canada, and 
recommended a language regime which allowed either Anglophone or Francophone 
Canadians to “feel at home”, anywhere in the country.70  In Quebec’s view, this pan-
Canadian approach was inadequate to protect French and promote it to a position of 
equivalence with English in Canada.  Instead, as Schmidt argues, Quebec believed that in 
order to establish equality in a bilingual country, against the tide of English, Quebec 
needed to be unilingually French.  In Schmidt’s words:   
Quebec’s rationale for Bill 101’s illiberal policy of restrictiveness was based on its 
understanding of the seriousness of the linguistic and cultural crisis faced by 
francophones in overwhelmingly anglophone North America….Because inequality 
between the two language groups was a fact of life from the time of the Conquest, there 
were reasons to believe that the individualistic premises of the liberal pluralist policy of 
the federal government would not succeed in protecting the survival of the Quebecois 
language and culture, much less ensure their elevation to the position of equality.71   
                                                 
69 McRae, supra, note 4 at 151. 
70 R. Beaujot, “Demographic Considerations in Canadian Language Policy” in Ricento & Burnaby, eds., 
supra, note 21 at 81. 
71 Schmidt, supra, note 21 at 54.  Emphasis added.  
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Thus, according to this argument, in order to promote equality, in response to the threat 
thereto posed by the federal government, Quebec adopted its essentially unilingual 
French language regime.   
 One may wonder, though, whether this argument is too facile and dismissive of 
the influence of nationalism? Moreover, does it mis-label as “protection of equality” what 
is just Quebec’s rejection of the Canadian national project?  I submit not.  While 
nationalism clearly has its own independent causal impact on outcomes in this policy 
sector,72 I do not believe that it is astute to reject the argument that Quebec’s policy 
choices were responding to a threat to equality.   
 Quebec has always sought equality for the French language within Canada and 
has genuinely perceived that its language laws are promulgated in order to overcome 
barriers to that equality.  As Premier Jean Lesage stated in a 1965 speech, “Quebec, as 
the cornerstone of French Canada, is asking for the equality of Canada’s two founding 
ethnic groups.  It is seeking a status that respects its special characteristics.”73  Moreover, 
Quebec has consistently rejected the separatist option, and has participated in further 
constitutional negotiations.  During each round of negotiations, Quebec has argued in 
favour of promoting French within Quebec and the rest of Canada,74 bolstering the initial 
argument that Quebec was motivated by threats to equality, rather than just brute 
nationalism, when designing its language laws.  Once again, I am not in a position in this 
paper to conclusively resolve which aspect of political culture affected the content of 
minority language rights but only to assert that it was indeed political culture which 
                                                 
72 Please see Footnote 1.    
73 Magnet, supra, note 36 at 200.   
74 For a summary of the language provisions of both the Meech and Charlottetown constitutional 
negotiations, please see Magnet, supra, note 36 at 200-1.     
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played a dominant causal role.  In my view, the above discussion achieves this modest 
goal.   
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I set out to determine what factors causally affected the content of minority 
language rights policies in the Countries.  I argued that two factors primarily influenced 
policy outcomes: relative situation of language groups and political culture.  By 
reviewing both how these Dominant Variables were integrated into policy outcomes and 
how policy outcomes shifted along with shifts in the Dominant Variables, I was able to 
ground my arguments.  But my discussion, as successful as it was, also left certain 
important questions unanswered.   
 First, as I outlined in my introduction, outcomes in this policy sector are more 
responsive to normative variables than institutional ones.  But, will this dichotomy hold, 
or, will institutional variables begin to assert more influence over policy outcomes?  For 
example, will tensions between language groups in Belgium reach a level such that the 
alarm-bell procedure is invoked to change the trajectory of a language initiative; or, will 
the CMEC become an organization of force, and co-operate with the federal government 
to institute genuine policy change respecting French language instruction in Canada?  
Only continued observation of this policy sector can answer these questions.  
 Second, even if the Dominant Variables continue to hold sway over policy 
outcomes in this sector, will they engender policy outcomes in line with past outcomes, 
or will they engender different policy outcomes?  For example, will the double-minority 
complex in Belgium become so deeply entrenched that the current language laws are 
irrelevant and Belgians begin to question the purpose of the federation?  Or, will the 
relative situation of the Francophone minority outside Quebec become so weak that it 
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loses its claim to language rights and the commitment to equality becomes absurd?  
These and other questions will also likely arise in the future; and again, it will be useful 
to continue to monitor this policy sector to observe how and if the Dominant Variables 
influence policy outcomes in the future.   
 Third, I found that IGR did not make a significant difference to policy outcomes 
in the minority language rights sector.  Why?  Perhaps it is because the arena of minority 
language rights is so politically charged that institutionalizing the debate would create 
nothing but additional conflict.  However, certain authors disagree and suggest that 
institutionalizing the arena would not create conflict, but rather, would channel and 
resolve the debate, converting it from a sensitive topic to a manageable dialogue.75  Since 
my paper focused on what factors did make a difference, I did not explore this discussion.  
As a student of IGR, though, I can not resist flagging it and identifying it as a topic of 
curiosity and interest.  I therefore conclude with a short warning:  perhaps a future paper 
will consider not what does matter to minority language rights, but why IGR does not!        
                                                 
75 McRae, supra, note 4 at 4; Magnet, supra, note 62 at 194.  
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PROVINCE OFFICIAL 
LANGUAGE 
OFFICIAL 
LANGUAGE 
MINORITIES 
(NUMBERS 
AND %)  
LANGUAGE OF 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
LANGUAGE OF 
INSTRUCTION IN 
EDUCATION 
SOURCE 
Alberta  52,500 
2.0 
No provincial policy or 
legislation on services in 
French. 
In practice, services may be 
provided on a “case-by-case” 
basis.   
 
Right of official language 
minority to instruction in French 
where the number is "sufficient" 
. 
17 French-language schools. 
 
http://207.228.248.225/usrlib/a
fi/profils/Profil%20AB%202002
-E.doc 
Phone conversation with 
official Denis Tardif, Director 
Francophone Directorate, on 
April 5, 2004.  
British 
Columbia 
 56,310 
1.5 
No provincial legislation or 
policy on the provision of 
services in French. 
Enquiry BC Call Centre 
provides multilingual service to 
all B.C. citizens on behalf of all 
ministries, crown corporations 
and public agencies, including 
in French. 
Some ministries are able to 
provide limited ad hoc services 
in French. 
The office of the manager, 
Canada-B.C. Agreement on 
Official Languages, offers 
minimal translation services to 
other government ministries and 
administers translation of other 
key documents identified by the 
francophone community. 
  
 
Parents who qualify under s. 23 
can send their children to 
French language schools. 
A Francophone Education 
Authority was created in 1995. 
In the 2001/2002 school year, 
there were 2873 students 
registered in the Francophone 
program (2325 in elementary, 
548 in secondary) administered 
by Conseil scolaire francophone 
de la C.-B. (CSF).  The CSF is 
offering its program in 40 
schools throughout the 
province.   
 
http://207.228.248.225/usrlib/a
fi/profils/Profil%20CB%202002
%20-%20E.doc 
Manitoba English 46,570 
4.4 
Manitoba provides bilingual 
government services in 6 
designated areas of the 
province. 
 
Parents who qualify under s. 23 
can send their children to 
French language schools.   
French language schools are 
offered through “Division 
Scolaire Franco-Manitobaine”.  
The DSFM has approximately 
4500 students and 22 schools 
in Manitoba.   
 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/fls-
slf/index.fr.html 
http://www.edu.gov.mb.ca/ms4
/progetu/prog-fr.html 
http://207.228.248.225/usrlib/a
fi/profils/Profil%20MB%202002
-E.doc 
E-mails with provincial officials 
Paule Buours from the Ministry 
of Education and Angele 
Saaghy from the French 
Language Services Secretariat 
on March 26 and 30, 2004. 
New Brunswick French/English 
 
241,040 
33.0% (French 
minority) 
New Brunswick provides 
services to the public in both 
official languages.  
Where services are offered to 
the public, there is a 
constitutional obligation to 
provide such services in the 
official language of choice. 
There are no exceptions based 
on the existence of minimum 
numbers of either linguistic 
community in a particular area.  
 
New Brunswick guarantees 
each education either official 
Language.  Parents are able to 
send their children either to 
Francophone or Anglophone 
schools so long as the child is 
able to function in the language 
of instruction of the school. 
The school system has two 
parallel structures, one in 
English and one in French. 
There are 107 French language 
elementary and high schools.   
 
http://www.gnb.ca/0163/ool-
blo/policy-e.asp 
http://207.228.248.225/usrlib/a
fi/profils/Profil%20NB%202002
-E.doc 
E -mail correspondence with 
provincial government official 
Barry Lyndon from the Ministry 
of Education on March 25, 
2004.  
Newfoundland English 2270 
0.4% 
There is no policy or law in 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
regarding the provision of 
provincial government services 
in French.   
Translation services are
Parents who qualify under s. 23 
can send their children to 
French language schools. 
There are currently 5 French 
language schools in 
Newfoundland and Labrador
http://www.gov.nf.ca/frenchser
vices/default.htm 
http://207.228.248.225/usrlib/a
fi/profils/Profil%20TN&L%2020
02-E.doc 
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